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A DEATH PENALTY WE CAN LIVE WITH
Rudolph J. Gerber*
Like perennial philosophy, the death penalty seems indestructible: it buries
its judicial undertakers. Recent cases which seemingly strike mortal blows at
its existence now exert peculiar impetus to mandate the very thing prohibited.
Both state and federal legislation at a broad level seek to reenact, or have re-
enacted, varieties of the death penalty more mechanical and less discretionary
than any mode of capital punishment in the history of the common law.
Another legislative stampede to the execution chambers is a dubious tech-
nique for controlling criminal traffic. This commentary advocates some official
premeditation over the wisdom of resurrecting death as an advertisement for
the value of life. This analysis includes the history, usage, effects, victims, and
by-products of capital punishment.
I. Background and History of the Death Penalty
A. Early Development and Use
Blood revenge, the earliest form of capital punishment, dominated all primi-
tive societies. Initially, its spirit was clearly retaliatory. Men killed to avenge
themselves and their kin long before their conduct was considered a wrong to
the community. Any blood relative, no matter how far removed, could be the
victim of the avenger's personal retribution. At one time, blood revenge com-
bined utmost savagery with an embracive familial code.' Early man had to flee
to cities of refuge or form protective familial alliances to escape the consequences
of such personal vengeance.
It is no surprise then that primitive criminal codes expressly endorsed per-
sonal revenge. Initially the law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a
private party or his family, not to punish him in the name of the state. Ham-
murabi's Floruit ("If a man destroy the eye of another man, they shall destroy
his eye") and Exodus ("Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for
foot") reinforced the right of individual retribution. But the command "life for
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth" was to its day an ethical advance; excessive
penalties were not in the interest of the community. The Talmud required that
vengeance be proportioned to the crime. If by only taking "measure for mea-
sure" God exercised self-restraint, "a fortiori must the victim of the offense, the
blood avenger, exercise it and never take vengeance beyond the measure of the
damage or mischief caused to him."2
Gradually, due to difficulties in arresting the spiral of revenge, the personal
* Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Arizona State University, member of Arizona
Bar.
1 G. ScoTT, MHsTORY oF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1950).
2 Cohn, The Penology of the Talmud, 5 ISRAEL L. Rxv. 53, 66 '(1970) Cf. M. MELTS-
nER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as MELTSNER], to which much of
this analysis is indebted.
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vendetta yielded to societal retribution. The movement, begun by Solon in the
sixth century B.C. in Athens and culminating in English common law, gave the
state the sole right and duty of vengeance. This political penology stabilized the
capricious avenger and also became a superior form of retribution. By allowing
only the impartial state to exact penal revenge, the citizenry acquired protection
against further personal injury. Today society carries a system of state-controlled
revenge to its ultimate triumph: a conscious or unconscious transformation into
a system espousing the deterrence of offenders and the protection of victims.
As crimes progressed from personal to national status, and as the principle
of deterrence became explicitly acknowledged in medieval England, increasing
numbers of offenses joined the list of capital crimes. Torture and death followed
by public degradation became the hallmark of punishment. In England, the
number of crimes punishable by the "bloody code" rose from eight at the end
of the 15th century to 223 shortly after 1800.'
The development of state-run retributory systems carried dangerous impli-
cations. Armed with powers of retaliation and deterrence, the state began not
only to curb personal crime but also to interfere violently with many forms of
political and religious activity. One need only consider the persecution of
witches during the Middle Ages and 17th century, the attack against heresy by
the Inquisition, and the barbarity employed by the Stuarts against political foes.
B. Reform Movements
The rise of democratic political philosophy in the 18th century initiated a
movement towards curbing excessive penal brutality. The effort, however, was
painfully slow. Voltaire wrote in 1748:
Is it possible that nations who boast of their reformation, of trampling
superstition under foot, who, indeed, supposed that they had attained the
perfection of reason, could believe in witchcraft, and, upon the strength
of such belief, proceed to burn poor women accused of that crime, and
this, more than an hundred years after the pretended reformation of their
reason?-4
The writings of Cesare Beccaria5 and Jeremy Benthams did much to end bru-
tality. Even severe Blackstone joined the opposition to excessive punishments:
For though the end of punishment is to deter men from offending, it never
can follow from thence that it is lawful to deter them at any rate and by
any means; since there may be unlawful methods of enforcing obedience
even to the justest laws.... But, indeed, were capital punishments proved
by experience to be a sure and effective remedy, that would not prove the
necessity . . . of inflicting them upon all occasions when other expedients
fail. I fear this reasoning would extend a great deal too far.7
3 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BEDAU],
an authoritative study of the ways and means of legal death, influential in this writing.
4 Voltaire, A Commentary appended to C. BEdOARrA, ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTS 190 (Ingraham transl. 1819) [hereinafter cited as BECCARIA].
5 BECCAhuA, supra note 4.
6 J. BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT (1830).
7 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *10.
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The exemplary value of capital punishment lay at the core of the debate
then as it does now. Consider James Fitzjames Stephen's celebrated dictum:
"The fact that men are hanged for murder is one great reason why murder is
considered so dreadful a crime." 8 It may be that capital punishment for murder
exerts a moral influence by indicating that life is the most highly protected value.'
Beccaria, on the other hand, from the same example drew the opposite con-
clusion:
The punishment of death is pernicious to society, from the example of bar-
barity it affords .... Is it not absurd, that the laws, which detest and punish
homicide, should, in order to prevent murder, publicly commit murder
themselves? 0
Thus Beccaria spelled out a position that dominated abolitionist thought
for a century. The death penalty was too quickly administered, too momentous
to be effective; it instilled compassion rather than fear in the observer. Crime
was curbed not by the "terrible but momentary spectacle" of the death of a
wretch but by "the continued example of a man deprived of his liberty, con-
demned as a beast of burden, to repair, by his labor, the injury he has done to
society."'"
Leading Americans slowly-but stoutly--got the message. In May of
1774, lecturing at the house of Benjamin Franklin, Dr. Benjamin Rush urged
that a "House of Reform" be built so that criminals could be taken off the
streets "and detained until purged of their antisocial habits."' 2 Drawing on the
earlier work of Beccaria, he asserted that scriptural support for the death penalty
was spurious. The threat of hanging, he felt, did not deter but rather increased
crime, and when a government puts one of its citizens to death "it exceeds the
powers entrusted to it."'
Rush proposed to remove the offender from the corrupt outside world by
imprisoning him. The miscreant should be housed in the "penitentiary"-a
new institution, which unlike jails, would isolate the convict from his fellow
inmates until he learned the error of his ways. In 1792, Rush expanded on this
theme in a famous tract: Considerations on the Injustice and Impolicy of
Punishing Murder with Death. He felt that capital punishment lessened the
horror of taking human life and influenced the suicidal to kill in order to end
their lives by hanging. Jurors, loath to see a capital sentence imposed, let mur-
derers go free. Prison avoided such problems:
If the punishment of murder consisted in long confinement and hard
labour, it would be proportioned to .. .our feelings of justice, and every
8 See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORUiY 58 '(1963).
9 Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 950,
967 (1966).
10 BECcARIA, supra note 4, at 104-05.
11 Id. at 99.
12 BEDAU, supra note 3, at 8. Rush, according to Bedau, is credited with being the father
of the abolition movement in the United States.
13 Id.
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member of society would be a watchman or a magistrate to apprehend a
destroyer of human life, and to bring him to punishment. 4
During the 1830's and 1840's, opponents of the death penalty began to
have a practical impact on the criminal law. In 1824 Edward Livingston
drafted a new penal code for Louisiana which substituted imprisonment for the
death penalty. Although Livingston's code was too progressive to be adopted,
it became a symbol to the abolitionists that their demands might be translated
into action. In the mid-1850's, Horace Greeley, founder of the New York Tri-
bune, became one of the leading critics of the death penalty. His efforts helped
influence Michigan in 1847, Rhode Island in 1852, and Wisconsin in 1853 to
abolish the death penalty, the first three political jurisdictions anywhere in the
world to abolish capital punishment.
When women got the vote and whiskey got the gate another surge in the
abolitionist movement produced many distinctively American developments in
penology: privacy of executions, redefinition of the crime of murder, new
methods of execution, and optional life sentences. Under the leadership of
Clarence Darrow and the warden of Sing Sing Prison, Lewis E. Lawes, eight
states--Kansas (1907), Minnesota (1911), Washington (1913), Oregon
(1914), North and South Dakota (1915), Tennessee (1915), and Arizona
(1916)-abolished the death penalty for murder and most other crimes.
The recent reform movement of the 1960's was in part the product of the
findings of the 1949 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, the United
Nations debates of the 1950's, and the 1956 Canadian Report on Capital Punish-
ment. The results of this movement prompted six more states-Oregon in 1964,
West Virginia, Vermont, Iowa, and New York in 1965, and New Mexico in
1969-to abolish the death penalty with little or no qualification.
The demise of some capital offenses, however, has been the birth of others.
After President William McKinley was assassinated in 1901, Connecticut and
New Jersey made murder of a public official a capital crime. Kidnapping was
elevated to capital status in two dozen states after the Lindbergh case in 1932.
Airline bombings in 1958 and 1959, air piracy in 1960 and 1961, and the assassi-
nation of President Kennedy in November 1963 prompted Congress to hysterical
recourse to death, reflecting again the widespread belief in its deterrent force.
C. Decline, Disuse, and Rebirth
Even before the moratorium on executions began in 1967, executions
totaled only 42 in 1961 and 47 in 1962. The number dwindled to 21 in 1963,
15 in 1964, and seven in 1965; in 1966 there was one execution and in 1967
there were two. On April 12, 1967, California sent Aaron C. Mitchell, a Black,
to the gas chamber; he had been convicted of killing a policeman in Sacramento
in 1963. On June 2, 1967, Colorado executed Luis Jose Monge, a Mexican-
14 B. RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF PUNISHING MURDER
BY DEATH 4 (M. Carey ed. 1792).
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American, in the state gas chamber; he too was a convicted murderer whose
refusal to appeal reflected his own death wish."5
This American moratorium reflects a worldwide trend mounting against
the death penalty with inchworm speed. It is no longer imposed in Britain,
although not all of her former colonies follow her lead. In the island nations
of Trinidad and Tobago, offenders are still hung by the neck until dead, to the
supposed edification of tourists.'6 The death penalty is still maintained in over
100 countries. Some have begun applying it as punishment in hijacking and
drug trafficking, verifying the United Nations' view that new forms of terror and
violence encourage a knee jerk reversion to the death penalty.
The worldwide survey undertaken by the United Nations indicates that of
133 nations involved in the survey, only nine-Austria, Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Iceland, Uruguay and Venezuela-
describe themselves as prohibiting capital punishment. Another 16 nations have
abolished the death penalty for all ordinary crimes but retain it for exceptional
crimes, such as treason or killing the head of state. Those nations are Afghani-
stan, Argentina, Brazil, Denmark, Israel, Italy, Malta, Nepal, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Sweden and the United King-
dom. In addition, three nations-Belgium, Luxembourg and Nicaragua--still
provide for a death penalty but have not in fact executed anyone for an ordi-
nary crime for at least 40 years. Moreover, many of the retentionist countries
use the death penalty so sparingly that, if one does not maintain the division
between political and ordinary crimes, they may actually be executing fewer
people than do certain "abolitionist" countries.
According to the U.N. report, the death penalty is regarded by a consider-
able number of governments as an efficient or at least an acceptable way of
getting rid of certain types of problems, despite what the experts may have to
say about the lack of a deterrent effect of this penalty. Moreover, it seems clear
that in most cases governments satisfy public opinion by using this sentence.
The U.N.'s position is that everyone has the right to life and no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punish-
ment, so that the death penalty ought eventually to be abolished everywhere.
II. Current Aspects of the Death Penalty
A. Murder and Its Characteristics
Murder remains far and away the prime capital crime. It accounts for
most executions in most countries. Accordingly, an examination of U. S. statistics
on murder is the prerequisite to understanding whatever deterrent effect capital
punishment may offer, as well as the types of minds it seeks to put to rest.
15 Cf. MELTSNER, supra note 2, at 114, where it is claimed that Monge "could not wait
to die." He had turned himself in, pled guilty, and refused to appeal. See the discussion of
suicide-prompted homicide, in text corresponding to notes 56-61 infra.
16 The author recalls a similar scene of three hanged Israeli spies, dangling from scaffolds
in the pale dawn of downtown Damascus in July of 1966. The men had been executed at
the height of the morning rush to work. Data in this section is from the UNITED NATIONS
REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISnMENT (1973).
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In 1973, there were 9.3 victims of murder for every 100,000 people in the
nation-a four percent increase from a rate of 8.9 in 1972.17 This represented
a five percent increase in the number of murders over 1972 and a 4-2 percent
increase in the number of murders over 1968. The Uniform Crime Reports
categorize these crimes by geographical area, population grouping, age, race,
sex, weapons used, and circumstances involved.
Geographically, 44 percent of the 1973 murders occurred in the Southern
States, 22 percent in the North Central States, 19 percent in the Northeastern
States, and 15 percent in the Western States. The number of murders in these
regions increased in 1973 over 1972 by four percent in the West and Northeast,
three percent in the South and approximately 11 percent in the North Central
States.
An analysis by population grouping shows that cities with 250,000 or
more inhabitants reported a 1973 murder rate of 20.7 victims per 100,000 (a
five percent increase over 1972), the suburban areas a rate of 5.1 (a nine per-
cent increase), and the rural areas a rate of 7.4 (a .2 percent increase).
Statistics on age reveal that the young are murdered and arrested for murder
more frequently than any other age group. Ten percent of all persons arrested
for murder in 1973 were under 18 years of age and 45 percent were under 25.
Numerically, the 20-24-year age group had the highest involvement during 1973
with 25 percent of the total arrests coming from within this group. The in-
creases since 1968 also reveal a trend toward younger murderers and victims.
During the period 1968-1973 there was a 59 percent increase in the number of
persons under 18 years of age arrested for murder, while during this same period
adult arrests increased 39 percent. Murder victims also tend to be young, with
30 percent of the victims between 20 and 29 years of age.
The victims of murder in 1973 were male in approximately three out of
four instances. This ratio of male-to-female victims is similar to the experience
in the last several years.
In 1973, firearms were the most frequently used weapon in the commission
of murder. Nationally, 67 percent of the homicides were committed with fire-
arms and 53 percent were committed with handguns. Cutting or stabbing
weapons were used in 18 percent of the murders; other weapons (blunt objects,
poisons, explosives, arson, etc.) were used in seven percent of the murders. The
remaining nine percent were committed by hand.
The circumstances which result in murder vary from family arguments to
felonious activities. Criminal homicide is largely a societal problem beyond the
control of police. The circumstances of murder emphasize this point. In 1973,
murder within the family made up approximately one-fourth of all murder
offenses. Over one-half of these family killings involved spouse killing spouse.
The remainder were parents killing children and other intrafamily killings.
The Uniform Crime Reports define felony murder as those killings resulting
from robbery, sex motive, gangland slaying, and other felonious activities. Felony
murders and suspected felony murders in 1973 constituted 29 percent of all
17 These percentages and all subsequent data are taken from FEDERAL BuREAu oF
INVESTIGATION, UNXFORM CriME REPORTS oF 1973 2-10 (1974).
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murders, whereas these two categories accounted for 25 percent of total murders
in 1968.
During 1973, seven percent of the murders resulted from romantic triangles
or lovers' quarrels. In murders involving husband and wife, the wife was the
victim in 52 percent of the incidents. In these incidents involving spouses, 49
percent of the victims were Blacks, and 50 percent Whites. The victims of felony
murder were 62 percent Whites, 37 percent Blacks, and the remaining one per-
cent of other races.
Criminal homicide is largely an unplanned act, often marked by predictable
behavior patterns supporting the recurring data in the Uniform Crime Reports.
In Philadelphia, for example, black males, who committed an equivalent of
41.7 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, were more likely to commit criminal
homicide than females, who, however, were more prone to homicide (9.3) than
the white male (3.4) and white female (.4). Criminal homicides were more
likely to occur during the weekend, especially on Saturday nights, between 8
p.m. and 2 a.m. Indeed, 65 percent of the criminal homicides (380) occurred
between 8 p.m. Friday night and midnight Sunday.
The criminal homicide generally results from a domestic quarrel, jealousy,
an argument over money, or a robbery. Most of the known victim-offender
relationships are close, intimate and frequent, and the usual homicide site is
the home. In robbery-slaying cases the victim and the robber are most often
strangers who were brought together by chance or involved in a sudden surprise
attack.
Although middle- and upper-class homicidal acts may be stimulated by a
sudden emotional crisis, they more likely exhibit major psychopathology or
planned deliberation. The relative rarity of upper- and middle-class homicide
suggests that cultural variables influence a person's tendency to commit homicide.
Murder or manslaughter more readily occurs if violence is an accepted part of
the subcultural value system.
Those investigating the weekend phenomenon of homicide not surprisingly
find that either or both the offender or his victim had been drinking prior to
the slaying. Many murders occur on the eve of receiving a paycheck which then
is squandered on alcohol.
In a careful study at the Florida State Penitentiary at Raiford, Dr. Shaw
Grigsby of the University of Florida found that as many as 75 percent of all
murderers were drinking prior to commission of the crime. 8 International data
support the same conclusion. 9 The statistic is instructive for advocates of capital
punishment's deterrent effect, for the more a violent person has been drinking,
the more suspect is the theory that he is likely to meditate upon the sober punish-
ment lurking ahead.
The problem of deterrence appears in new guise in light of the blurred
nature of murder and assault. Zimring has shown that assault and murder are
18 BEDAu, supra note 3, at 186. The foregoing analysis is from Wolfgang's study in
BEPAU at 464.
19 See Schwartz, Conflict Without Violence and Violence Without Conflict in a Mexican
Mestizo Village, in COLLETIVE VsorENCZ 151 (J. Short & M. Wolfgang, eds. 1972), where
the author states that there exists "an overwhelming correlation" between alcohol and violence.
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inseparable in a large proportion of crimes.2" Most murders are merely "com-
plete" assaults; otherwise, their motives and means and origins do not differ.
Whether the assault leads to murder often depends on whether or not a weapon
is present and whether it is a knife, a small-caliber gun, or a large-caliber gun.
Murders and assaults are both largely matters of "weapon and alcohol con-
venience"; their severity could be reduced not only by executing murderers, but
also by restricting weapons or alcohol, which would cost more money-but
save more lives.
B. Execution and Deterrence
Also helpful to an evaluation of deterrence as a justification for the death
penalty is an examination of data pertinent to the application of the death
penalty. That is, is the death penalty imposed in such a way as to be of signif-
icant deterrent effect?
Women criminals are rarely punished by death. One reason is that women
are involved, arrested, held for court action, and found guilty for crime less fre-
quently than men.
Racial data, however, reveal more discrimination than sex data. Of 3,857
persons executed in the United States from 1930 to 1966, inclusive, 1,750 (45.4
percent) were Whites; 2,065 (53.5 percent) were Blacks; 42 (1.1 percent)
were of other races. The number of Blacks executed has been disproportionate
to their representation in the total population in these thirty-seven years:
Based upon a refined statistical analysis of rape convictions in states where
rape has been a capital crime, this study shows that there has been a pat-
terned, systematic, customary imposition of the death penalty. Far from
being "freakish" or capricious, sentences of death have been imposed on
blacks, compared to whites, in a way that exceeds any statistical notion
of chance or fortuity.21
In the North, the fact that most persons executed are Black or poor or
young is not conclusive of discrimination. Murder occurs disproportionately
among the young, the poor and the Black. Wolfgang's study of 439 persons
sentenced to death for murder found Blacks only slightly more likely than whites
to be executed (88 percent of Blacks and 80 percent of whites were executed).
Whites charged with felony murder were three times as likely as Blacks to achieve
commutation. Occupation and social class have little effect on commutation.
Blacks having private counsel, however, were much more likely to get a com-
mutation than Blacks having court-appointed counsel.
In the South, however, Blacks, especially those who murdered or raped
a white person, have been much more likely than whites to be sentenced to
death. In more than 3,000 rape convictions in 11 Southern States between 1945
and 1965, a Black convicted of rape, though not likely to be executed, was
20 F. ZIMRING & G HAWKINS, DETERRENCE passim (1973) [hereinafter cited as ZIMRING
& HAWKINS] and F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTMVSS ON DERRnNcE (1971).
21 Wolfgang & Riedel, Race and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 119 '(1973).
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seven times as likely to be executed as a white. A Black rapist of a white woman
was 18 times as likely to be executed as all other racial combinations. In parts
of the South, heavier penalties for Blacks seem common for many offenses, not
just those punishable by death.22
Of the 631 persons on death row in 1972, just before the death penalty was
held unconstitutional, 364 (57.7 percent) were nonwhite. Despite the resur-
rected capital punishment laws, the 145 persons presently on death row include
84 nonwhites--a total of 57.9 percent.2 3 It may be that these statistics reflect
criminal propensities irradicable by any redrafted death penalty because of subtle
economic and subcultural differences from the white man's morality. But it may
also be that deterrence, as presently articulated, is too simplistic a concept.
The deterrence issue is not really whether the death penalty deters
would-be murderers. Rather, the issue is whether it deters more effectively than
the prospect of life imprisonment. Whether any penalty has a deterrent effect is
disputable, but a warranted death penalty would have to supply an additional
increment of deterrence sufficient to offset the costs of imposing it instead of life
imprisonment.
One of the most celebrated invocations of the unilateral deterrent approach
to crime control is British Chief Justice Lord Ellenborough's classic response to
a proposal that, while the death penalty for shoplifting should remain, the value
of the goods stolen which incurred that penalty be raised from five to ten
shillings.
Speaking in the House of Lords, Ellenborough said:
I trust your lordships will pause before you assent to an experiment pregnant
with danger to the security of property .... Such will be the consequence
of the repeal of this statute that I am certain depredations to an unlimited
extent would immediately be committed .... Repeal this law and.., no
man can trust himself for an hour out of doors without the most alarming
22 Wilson, The Death Penalty, New York Times, October 28, 1973, § 6 (Magazine), at
34 [hereinafter cited as Wilson]. Wolfgang's data is collected in BWMAU, supra note 3, at 464.
23 Legal Defense Fund, private report, Sept. 8, 1974.
Persons Awaiting Execution as of October 8, 1974
North Carolina 49
Florida 29
Georgia 18
Louisiana 8
California 5
Massachusetts 5
New Mexico 5
Oklahoma 6
Texas 5
Wyoming 4
Ohio 3
Arizona 2
Virginia 2
Mississippi 1
Pennsylvania 1
Utah 1
Tennessee 1
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apprehension that on his return, every vestige of his property will be swept
off by the hardened robber.2 4
Another example may be found in the celebrated passage in The Saint
Petersburg Dialogues in which Joseph de Maistre writes of the public execu-
tioner:
And yet all grandeur, all power, all subordination rests on the execu-
tioner: he is the horror and the bond of human association. Remove this
incomprehensible agent from the world, and at that very moment order gives
way to chaos, thrones topple, and society disappears.25
Proving that severity is not limited to the aristocracy, the Supreme Court of
Georgia took advantage of a capital case pending before it to ridicule the notion
that rape does not deserve the death penalty:
No determination of this question is either wise or humane if it fails to take
full account of the major place in civilized society of woman. She is the
mother of the human race, the bedrock of civilization; her purity and virtue
are the most priceless attributes of human kind. The infinite instances where
she has resisted even unto death the bestial assaults of brutes who were trying
to rape her are eloquent and indisputable proof of the human agonies she
endures when raped. . . . Even a cur dog is too humane to do such an
outrageous injury to the female .2
What then of this much-touted deterrent effect? Thorsten Sellin has been
responsible for the best-known studies.2' He compared homicide rates between
adjacent states with and without the death penalty. The crude rates for homicide
in these groups of states appear to be about the same. He also compared homi-
cide rates for states before and after they abolished or restored the death penalty.
Again the rates did not change significantly with the change in status of the
penalties. He then examined homicide rates in those cities where executions
occurred. Again there was no difference in the homicide rate before and after
the executions. Actually, the homicide rate is about 40 percent higher in jurisdic-
tions with capital punishment than in those without, which at least indicates that
the death penalty states have greater cause to invoke the death penalty in the first
place.
Similar studies with similar results have been made by Robert Dann,2
Leonard D. Savitz29 and William Graves" Graves even uncovered evidence in
California that prompted him to speculate that homicides increased on the days
24 From Parliamentary Debates: House of Lords, May 30, 1810, cited in R. CALVERT,
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 7-8 (1927).
25 THE WORKS OF JOSEPH DEMAISTRE 192 (J. Lively ed. 1965).
26 Jims v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 10, 136 S.E.2d 766, 769 (1964).
27 See Sellin, Murder and the Death Penalty, 284 Annals 1-166 (1952); Sellin, The
Death Penalty, in MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The following summary
parallels that in Wilson, supra note 22.
28 Reprinted in BEDAU, supra note 3, at 343.
29 Id. at 315.
30 Id. at 322.
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immediately preceding an execution. To him, the emotional arousal and sug-
gestibility associated with the death penalty seem to create homicidal tensions
countering deterrent warnings."
Sellin also has sought to discover whether law enforcement officers are safer
from murderous attacks in states with the death penalty than those without it.
He found that the victim-homicide rate of police officers in states that had
abolished capital punishment matched the rate in states retaining the death
penalty. Campion and Jayewardene reached the same conclusion after studying
the deaths of police officers&2
The rejoinder to these findings often is to the effect that while executions
may not deter murderers generally, they will protect prison guards and other
inmates from convicts who have nothing to lose. In response to this theory,
Sellin compiled a list of 59 murderers in state and federal prisons in 1965. He
concluded that it is "visionary" to believe that the death penalty could reduce
the hazards of life in prison. Eleven of the prison murders were found in states
without capital punishment and 43 in states with it, the others being in federal
prisons.
The latest official data may be still more convincing. The dry morass of
the 1973 Uniform Crime Reports, released in September 1974 bears crucially
on the deterrent impact of capital punishment during its 1973 moratorium. If
the penalty does in fact deter, its widely assumed abolition by the Supreme
Court in 1972 ought to have resulted in removing the fetters from would-be
premeditative murderers. The facts are otherwise, and strildngly so. While in
1973 murders increased in number, the rate of increase remained identical-
five percent-to that recorded in 1972. Increase in the victimization rate oc-
curred at a lesser level-four percent-than the five percent reported for 1972.
In addition, the rate of increase per 100,000 persons in 1973 was 35 percent-
markedly less than the rates for aggravated assault (40 percent), forcible rape
(55 percent), and robbery (39 percent) during the same period. Furthermore,
the numerical increase in total murder stems almost entirely from increases in
two heat-of-passion, in-the-home homicides: parent killings of a child (up to 3.2
percent of the total from 2.9 percent in 1972) and lovers'-quarrel killings (up to
7.5 percent from 7.1 percent). Most surprising to deterrence advocates was the
decrease in known felony murders (murders occurring as part of a planned
crime) from 22.1 percent of the 1972 total to 21.6 percent in 1973, indicating
that the unavailability of capital punishment in 1973 coexisted with a decline
rather than an anticipated increase in planned personal violence.
Enough is now known from these studies to raise serious doubts about the
deterrent impact of the death penalty. Those bent on homicide eitther do not
consider the penalty or, if they do, do not consider it a strong threat. In this
light, police and prosecutor attitudes seem to reflect merely an overanxious search
31 Graves' speculations on this point are underscored by Sellin, The Death Penalty, supra
note 27, at 60-65.
32 Reprinted in BEDAu, supra note 3, at 301. During 1961-70, 37 policemen were killed
in Canada. "The data do not support the thesis that the absence of the death penalty in-
creases risks to policemen," according to a recent study, Jayewardene, The Death Penalty and
the Safety of Canadian Policemen, 15 (AN. J. CRIMINOLOGY & CORREGTIONS 356, 366 (1973).
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for a panacea. These attitudes confirm what has been termed, perhaps unkindly,
the "Tiger Prevention" theory. The name is derived from a well-known tale: a
man seen on a main street snapping his fingers explained that the finger-snapping
was "keeping tigers away." Upon being told that there were no tigers within
five thousand miles, his answer was, "Well, then I must have a pretty effective
technique." 3 The point of that story is amply reinforced by prisoners' related
experiences. Clinton Duffy, former warden of the California State Prison at San
Quentin, has told the story, which he means to be paradigmatic, of how one of
the men who built the first gas chamber at San Quentin ended up several years
later as one of its victims. 4 Similarly, Charles Justice, builder of the Ohio State
electric chair, died in it forty years after building it.
At most, these multiple deterrence studies show that abolishing capital
punishment does not lead to any increase in homicide. One would not be able
to say much more. Such factors as age (the young commit more murders),
region (the South has proportionately more murders than the North), race
(Blacks are more likely to murder, and to be murdered, than Whites) and class
(the poor are more likely to murder, and to be murdered, than the well-to-do)
33 The illustration is borrowed from ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 27, and is
reinforced by the unfounded clinging to deterrence illustrated in these pages by Vance, The
Death Penalty After Furman, 48 NovaE DAME LAWYER 850 (1973). Actually:
[T]he chief risk of death from crime is not execution, but killing at the hands of a
policeman or other citizen during or after the commission of the crime. A study
showed that in Chicago between 1934 and 1954, policemen killed 69 and other
people killed 261 homicide suspects. During the same period, Chicago had only 43
executions. Thus the presence of the death penalty raises the risk of death for the
criminal only slightly. Most of that risk is equally present in the abolition state.
T. SELLIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 124 (1967).
To provide a more refined and theoretically sound examination of the relationship be-
tween the death penalty and capital homicide, Bailey conducted a survey of state bureaus of
prisons throughout the country requesting admission statistics for first and second degree
murder for 1967 and 1968, with the following results:
First, a comparison of death penalty and abolition states for both 1967 and 1968 revealed
mean offense rates of first degree murder, second degree murder, total murder and homicide
to be substantially higher in jurisdictions retaining capital punishment. Further, for all four
categories, for both years, mean rates for death penalty states exceeded average rates for the
country.
Secondly, to meet the common objection that comparison of rates for capital punishment
and abolition states ignores other possibly important etiological factors, rates of eight group-
ings of contiguous states which differ in the provision for the death penalty were examined.
For first degree murder, for both years, over 60 percent of the neighboring states examined
showed rates to be higher in death penalty jurisdictions, while less than 30 percent of the
contiguous states showed rates higher in abolition jurisdictions.
Thirdly, to further control for other possibly important etiological factors, rates for all
four categories were also compared for death penalty and abolition states similar on two
socioeconomic and five demographic variables. In addition, abolition and retentionist states
having similar aggravated assault rates were compared. This analysis revealed that for all
categories, for both years, at all levels on the control variables (with but one exception), rates
were higher in capital punishment states.
Fourthly, to look beyond simply the normative provisions for the death penalty, execution
rates and offense rates were examined in death penalty jurisdictions. For all four categories,
for both years, the association between risk of execution and offense rate was found to be in
the predicted inverse proportion.
The findings summarized above are, according to Bailey, consistent with those of earlier
investigations of homicide but quite contrary to what deterrence theory would predict. W.
Bailey, Murder and Capital Punishment: Some Further Evidence, 1974 (unpublished report
at Cleveland State University).
34 C. DUFFY, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN 155 (1962). Duffy's survey of opinions from in-
mates is untrustworthy, however, because prisons do not include those persons who in fact
were effectively deterred by the death penalty. Cf. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 31.
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all contribute to the homicide rate. If these factors are reckoned in any statistical
explanation of the murder rate, the deterrent importance of the death penalty
or its absence to the analysis is likely to be slight."
C. Furman v. Georgia
Furman v. Georgia'6 spared the lives of 631 persons under sentence of
death. An analysis of Furman is a prerequisite to understanding the future of
capital punishment. Two of the five justices who supported the result in Furman
believed the death penalty to be a per se violation of the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Brennan listed four principles
essential to determining whether a punishment violates the "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause of the eighth amendment: (1) it must not be so severe as
to be degrading to the dignity of human beings; (2) it must not be arbitrarily
inflicted; (3) it must not be unacceptable to contemporary society; and (4) it
must not be excessive. Examining the death penalty in light of these norms,
Brennan concluded that the penalty violates all four: It is unusually severe and
degrading, it is inflicted arbitrarily, its rejection by contemporary society is
virtually total, and it serves no penal purpose more effectively than the less severe
punishment of imprisonment.37
Justice Marshall, also finding the penalty per se unconstitutional, examined
the history of the penalty and found that it violates the Constitution because it is
excessive and unnecessary. The death penalty is excessive and unnecessary
because it does not serve any of the six conceivable purposes for its existence:
retribution, deterrence, prevention of repetitive criminal acts, encouragement
of guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economy. He concluded that its
lack of utility makes it "morally unacceptable to the people of the United States
at this time in their history."3
The opinions of the other three justices on the majority of the Court
(Douglas, Stewart and White) do not specifically hold the death penalty un-
constitutional per se but hold that its imposition in the cases before the court
violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments. All three justices specifically
refused to consider whether the death penalty is per se unconstitutional.
The import of these three opinions is that since the death penalty is not un-
constitutional per se, a constitutional system of capital punishment could be
devised by avoiding present inequities. The features of the present system that
make it objectionable are: (1) according to Justice Douglas, that it allows the
penalty to be discriminatorily and disproportionately applied to the poor, the
Blacks, and the members of unpopular groups; (2) according to Justice
Stewart, that it allows the penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed;'
and (3) according to Justice White, that the infrequent imposition of the penalty
35 Wilson, snpna note 22, at 42.
36 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 '(1972).
37 Id- at 271-310 (concurring opinion).
38 Id. at 360 (concurring opinion).
39 Id. at 249 (concurring opinion).
40 Id. at 309-10 (concurring opinion).
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makes the threat of execution too weak to be of any real service to criminal
justice.41
Chief Justice Burger and the other dissenting justices on the Court held
that the death penalty is not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
eighth amendment. Examination of the historical evidence on the early use of
the death penalty led Chief Justice Burger to conclude that it was not intended
to be included in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Even though en-
forced death is cruel and its use has been increasingly unusual, that does not
render it cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense. Burger observed that the
fifth amendment to the Constitution itself explicitly recognizes the power to inflict
the death penalty: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ....
Justice Blackmun could not agree that the death penalty is unconstitutional
as a "matter of history, or law, or of constitutional pronouncement." He found
that the legislative enactments embodying the death penalty indicate the present
moral climate of the United States as tolerating the death penalty. 3
Agreeing with Burger's historical and constitutional analysis, Justice Powell
added that on every occasion where the Supreme Court has touched on the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty, it has tacitly assumed that the Constitution did
not prohibit the death penalty." Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the above
opinions, adds a scolding at the Court for its lack of judicial self-restraint. 4
The most interesting parts of the dissenting opinions, however, are the
exegetical attempts to interpret the holding of the majority. The Chief Justice
explains his own confusion as follows:
The actual scope of the Court's ruling, which I take to be embodied in these
concurring opinions [of Justices Stewart and White], is not entirely clear.
This much, however, seems apparent: if the legislatures are to continue to
authorize capital punishment for some crimes, juries and judges can no
longer be permitted to make the sentencing determination in the same man-
ner as they have in the past.
Whlile I do not undertake to make a definitive statement as to the parameters
of the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state legislatures and the Congress
wish to maintain the availability of capital punishment, significant statutory
changes will have to be made. Since the two pivotal concurring opinions
(Stewart and White) turn on the assumption that the punishment of death
is now meted out in a random and unpredictable manner, legislative bodies
may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the Court's ruling by
providing standards of juries and judges to follow in determining the sen-
tence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the crimes for which the
penalty is to be imposed. If such standards can be devised or the crimes
more meticulously defined, the result cannot be detrimental.
Real change could dearly be brought about if legislatures provide man-
datory death sentences in such a way as to deny juries the opportunity to
41 Id. at 311-12 (concurring opinion).
42 Id. at 380 (dissenting opinion).
43 Id. at 411-14 (dissenting opinion).
44 Id. at 428 (dissenting opinion).
45 Id. at 470 (dissenting opinion).
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bring in a verdict on a lesser charge; under such a system, the death sentence
could only be avoided by a verdict of acquittal4
Apparently, then, when all opinions are read in unison, the three alternatives
open to legislatures wishing to retain the death penalty are:
1. Provide standards for juries and judges to follow in determining the
sentence in capital cases;
2. More narrowly define the crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed;
or,
3. Provide an inescapable, mandatory death sentence upon conviction for
specified crimes.
Actually all three of these alternatives are interdependent. If a legislature pro-
vides mandatory death for a specified crime, it would also limit such a severe
punishment to very narrowly defined crimes and establish standards for its im-
position.
Several seemingly exemplary statutes mentioned in the Court's opinions im-
pose mandatory death sentences for specific crimes and receive gentler treatment
at the hands of the Court. Federal law requires the death penalty for any person
convicted of acting as a spy for the enemy in time of war." Rhode Island re-
quires the death penalty for a life-term prisoner who commits murder. 48 Massa-
chusetts requires death for anyone convicted of murder in the commission of
forcible rape." Ohio imposes mandatory death upon the assassin of the President
of the United States or of the governor of a state."0 In his opinion, Justice
Stewart suggests that he does not include these statutes in his conclusion that the
death penalty is unconstitutional." Justice Powell takes further note of this and
states that "since Rhode Island's only capital statute-murder by a life termer
-is mandatory . .. [it is not] struck down by virtue of the Court's decision
today."5
2
All of this is not to say that a mandatory death penalty is constitutional, but
merely that a mandatory death penalty has the better claim on constitutionality.
However, in his tortured dissent, the Chief Justice confessed that he could more
easily be persuaded that mandatory sentences of death "are so arbitrary and
doctrinaire" that they violate the Constitution.
D. New Legislation
For many Americans today, capital punishment is almost a forgotten issue.
But not so to Jesse Lee Coley, a 29-year-old convicted of rape in Georgia and
sentenced in April 1973 to be electrocuted; nor to Wallace L. Rhodes, Jr., and
46 Id. at 397, 400-01 '(dissenting opinion).
47 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 906 (1970). See Note, The Future of
Capital Punishment in Florida, 64 J. CRan. L.C. & PS. 2, 9-10 (1973), whose analysis is
followed here.
48 R.I. GEN. L&ws ANN. § 11-23-2 (Supp. 1973).
49 MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 265, § 2 (1968).
50 Onro Rnv. CoDE ANN. §§ 2901.09, 2901.10 (1954).
51 408 U.S. at 307-08 (concurring opinion).
52 Id. at 417 n.2.
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James M. Shields, two Idaho jail escapees, who in July 1973 were sentenced
to be hanged for the kidnapping and murder of a Montana jeweler; nor to more
than 140 other defendants in 19 states who have been sentenced to death since
the Supreme Court decision in Furman. Their plight reflects the fact that the
court did not abolish capital punishment; it only barred the haphazard manner
of its past imposition and served billboard size notice to legislatures on how to
revive legal death.
The Senate has passed a bill which would make the death penalty available
for treason, assassination, certain serious acts of sabotage and espionage, and for
kidnapping and skyjacking resulting in death.' The death sentence for such
crimes would be determined through a posttrial hearing in which a jury would
evaluate itemized aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the
offense. The death penalty would be obviated if the hearing discovered just one
mitigating factor, such as the fact that the defendant was under age 18. Death
would be mandatory, however, if an aggravating factor was found in the absence
of any mitigation.
Meanwhile 29 states have already reinstated the death penalty designed in
their own ways to meet what they surmise are the Supreme Court's objections.
The pattern usually is to limit executions to certain major but relatively uncom-
mon offenses (for example, killing a police officer) or to reduce judicial discretion
in imposing death sentences so as to avoid charges of arbitrariness. No one has
yet been executed, and no such law has yet been tested before the Supreme
Court, although Tennessee's5 4 and New York's 5 typical statutes have been struck
down by their high courts.
In effect, the Furman decision has paradoxically focused legislative attention
on making death mandatory for various offenses. These new laws may well
rescue or even augment the use of capital punishment by making its application
inescapable. As a result, capital punishment must be debated anew on its merits
without recourse to the easy assumption that capricious administration will ac-
complish what appeals to public opinion cannot.
III. Arguments Against Reenacting the Death Penalty
A. Suicide via Murder
There are several cogent reasons why we should not enact a death penalty
"which we can live with." The first is the "suggestibility" of executions on
persons with suicidal tendencies.
It is a curious fact that sensational acts are self-propagating. There are cases
on record showing that the warped desire to be executed has caused persons to
53 S. 1401, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. '(1974).
54 State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. 1974). The case, however, was not decided
upon the eighth amendment.
55 People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139 (1973). None of the new
capital punishment laws enacted to date handles either sentencing or nonsentencing in a
way acceptable to Furman. Indeed, no death penalty is likely to pass muster as long as pros-
ecutors, juries, and governors possess wide-ranging, undefined discretion in charging, acquit-
ting, and pardoning. Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statutes, 87 HARy. L. REv. 1690, 1692, 1719 (1974).
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commit capital crimes. Such crimes are indirect forms of suicide, reflecting a
pathological desire to die by more courageous hands than the victim's own.
One example covers a multitude: In 1820, in Dresden, Germany, when a
murderer was beheaded publicly, the ritual made such an impression on a weak-
minded woman present that four weeks later she killed a girl visiting her. She
surrendered to police, who found the date of the original execution carved on her
door. She reported that this execution, as well as two others she had witnessed in
1804 and 1809, had given her the idea of committing a murder so that she
could die in the same way. Sellin lists a long series of such offenses."'
To what extent the desire for self-immolation lies subtly hidden in the
motivation of murderers is a problem for psychiatrists. The instances are real
though no doubt rare. Those involved might be found to be mentally deranged
and placed in appropriate institutions. However, without the existence of the
death penalty, these rare murders might not have occurred. Strangely, the
evidence indicates that three of the last four men executed in this country wanted
to die at the hands of the state." Graves' similar discovery of increased homicides
at the time of executions suggests that the state's example of taking life actually
encourages others to follow it." If so, the deterrent effect of a typical execution
is offset by its "brutalizing" effect.
Although the possibility of executions inciting persons to criminal violence
may provoke sophomoric derision, it receives passing support in current psychi-
atric literature. On the phenomenon of "suicide by murder" Dr. Isador Zifer-
stein, a Los Angeles psychiatrist, writes:
A couple of fairly recent cases come to mind. One, the case of a disc jockey
from Las Vegas who shot a complete stranger on the streets of Los Angeles
in broad daylight. On being arrested, he stated that he had been despondent
for some time but did not have the courage to commit suicide. He therefore
chose murder as an indirect route to his own destruction. A similar case oc-
curred a couple of years ago in Los Angeles, where a man, after several un-
successful attempts at suicide, killed his landlady and turned himself in.
As I recall, the state eventually obliged him by executing him. For every
case where this mechanism of suicide-by-murder is conscious and is verbal-
ized, there are probably several where the same mechanism is unconscious
and not manifestly verbalized, although it can be deduced from a careful
study and interpretation of the material. In these cases, obviously, the death
penalty is not a deterrent, but has quite the opposite effect of motivating
the sick person to commit murder.59
56 Sellin, supra note 27, at 60, from whom this example is taken.
57 See note 15 supra. Hearings on S. 1, S. 1400, S. 1401 before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 93d Gong., 1st Sess., at 164, (1972) (statement of Douglas Lyons).
58 See note 30 Xspra.
59 Zieferstein, A Psychiatrist Looks at Capital Punishment, 8 FRONTIER 5, 6 (Jan. 1957).
S. PALMER, THE PREVENTION OF CRIME (1973) asserts that homicide offenders are almost
universally frustrated psychologically or sociologically, with aggression patterns dating from
youthful exposure to violence in the home or on television. Id. at 25.
Dr. Louis West, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Oklahoma, describes several
suicide by murder/notoriety by murder cases in his testimony in Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Laws, 90th Cong.. 2d Sess., at 126-27 '(1968):
Recently an Oklahoma truck driver had parked to have lunch in a Texas roadside
cafe. A total stranger-a farmer from nearby-walked through the door and blew
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The identical point applies to other crimes such as kidnapping and sky-
jacking where distraught persons kill in distraught circumstances. In The Sky.
jacker"° (the result of extensive psychiatric studies of skyjackers) Hubbard argues
that skyjackers are universally deranged individuals desirous of dying but unable
to do the job themselves. Offering death to a skyjacker is, in Hubbard's words,
"like offering candy to a child for being bad." As to the kidnapper, imposing
death for the abduction achieves nothing beyond endangering the victim, for
the kidnapper has nothing to lose by killing his victim. On the other hand,
reserving capital punishment for the killing of the kidnapee punishes an im-
pulsive, desperate, and distraught act analogous to, if not identical with, a crime
committed in the "heat of passion" which the law has never punished as the
most severe degree of homicide. As to qualifying felony murder for capital
punishment, the simple and honest response is that the felony murder rule itself
is an anachronism, with an extensive history of thoughtful condemnation as its
only badge of honor.61
B. Mandatory Standards Will Not Eliminate Discretion
Sidney Hook, retired professor of philosophy at New York University, and
a proponent of the death penalty, offers sobering strictures against a man-
datory death sentence:
One thing is clear. From the standpoint of those who base the case for
him in half with a shotgun. When the police finally disarmed the man and asked
why he had done it, he replied, "I was just tired of living."
In 1964 Howard Otis Lowery, a life-term convict in an Oklahoma prison, formally
requested a judge to send him to the electric chair after a District Court jury found
him sane following a prison escape and a spree of violence. He said that if he could
not get the death penalty from the jury he would get it from another, and com-
plained that officials had failed to live up to an agreement to give him death in
the electric chair when he pleaded guilty to a previous murder charge in 1961.
Another murderer, James French, asked for the death penalty after he wantonly
killed a motorist who gave him a ride while hitch-hiking through Oklahoma in 1958.
However he was "betrayed" by his Court-appointed attorney who pleaded him guilty
and got him a life sentence instead of the requested execution. Three years later
French strangled his cell-mate for no obvious reason: a deliberate, premeditated
slaying. He has been convicted three times for that crime, declared legally sane and
sentenced to death each time. This sentence he deliberately invites in well-organized,
literate epistles to the Courts and in provocative challenges to the jurors. During
a psychiatric examination in 1965 French admitted to me that he had seriously
attempted suicide several times in the past but "chickened out" at the last minute,
and that a basic motive in his murdering another prisoner was to force the State
to deliver the electrocution to which he feels entitled and which he deeply desires.
Many other examples may be found in which the promise of the death penalty
consciously or unconsciously invites violence. Sellin reviewed a number of them.
Wertham's analysis of Robert Irwin, who attempted suicide by murder, is a classic.
Some who seek execution even borrow somebody else's murder! A few months ago
Joseph Shay in Miami admitted that he had falsely confessed to an unsolved murder
"because I wanted to die."
60 D. HUBBAU, THE SKYJACKER 229-30 (1971).
61 See Note, Felor's Responsibility for Death of Accomplie, 65 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1496
(1955); Note, California Rewrites Felony Murder Rule, 18 STAN. L. Rav. 690 (1966).
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retention of capital punishment on the necessity of "satisfying community
needs," there should be no justification whatsoever for the mandatory death
sentence attempts to determine in advance what the community need and
feeling will be, and closes the door to fresh inquiry about the justice as well
as the deterrent consequences of any proposed punishment.6 2
Judge Fuld, in People v. Fitzpatrick," restates a similar criticism in reflecting on
the aftermath of Furman:
[Mjandatory sentences for crimes do not best serve the ends of the criminal
justice system. Now, after the long process of drawing away from the blind
imposition of uniform sentences for every person convicted of a particular
offense, we are confronted with an argument perhaps implying that only the
legislatures may determine that a sentence of death is appropriate, without
the intervening evaluation of jurors or judges."'
Governor Dan Walker made the same point in vetoing proposed Illinois death
penalty legislation with the kind of example that escapes standardization:
A mandatory death penalty is troublesome for still another reason-it takes
away from judge and jury an opportunity to exercise the quality of mercy
based on the particular facts of the case before them. Is there any category
of crime so heinous that everyone who commits it must be executed regard-
less of circumstances? I cannot accept that view. These bills provide
mandatory execution for murder of a fireman on duty. Suppose, for
example, that a fireman has a fight with his wife, beats her unmercifully,
and goes on duty. Enraged, she follows him to the fire station and shoots
him. She is guilty of murder of a fireman. Should she be automatically
executed? Suppose that a father kills two men who have raped his
daughter. He is guilty of double murder. Should he be automatically
executed? Under these bills there would be no choice.6 5
Other discretionary problems abound for the jury. Because Furman is a due
process decision, it demands that McGautha v. California,"6 upholding the con-
situtionality of the death-imposition process, be confronted. McGautha ad-
dressed the question whether juries empowered to impose or withhold the death
penalty should be given standards by which to exercise that power. The Court
refused any standards, holding "it is quite impossible to say that committing to
the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in
capital cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution."6 In Furman, however,
it is precisely this "untrammeled" discretion that makes the administration of the
death penalty "offensive" to the Constitution. If Furman is right, McGautha is
wrong, for McGautha permits absolute jury discretion in sentencing.
Writing for the McGautha Court, justice Harlan concluded that it is im-
62 Hook, Symposium on Capital Punishment (Panel Discussion 2), 7 N.Y.L.F. 276, 281(1961) [emphasis supplied].
63 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139 (1973).
64 Id. at 512 n.2, 300 N.E.2d at 145 n.2, citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 402-03
"(1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65 Letter to the 78th Illinois General Assembly from Governor Dan Walker, November,
1973.
66 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
67 Id. at 207.
[Vol. 50: 251]
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
possible to predict in advance the types of offenders worthy of death and those
who are not:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and
their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by
the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human
ability.68
He rejected the approach of the Model Penal Code and that recommended in
January 1971 by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws. Instructing the jury about aggravating or mitigating factors gave at best
minimal control over the jury's exercise of discretion. Additionally, the factors
enumerated in the model codes were not exhaustive. Their incompleteness sug-
gested the "intractable" nature of the problem of drafting standards.6 The jury
in McGautha, Harlan noted, had been able to distinguish between McGautha
and his less culpable codefendant who had received a life sentence. If the Court
attempted to enumerate the appropriate factors, the result might be to inhibit
rather than expand the scope of consideration since no list could be comprehen-
sive. Thus, McGautha holds that specific standards to aid juries in determining
the appropriate punishment are actually impossible to fashion. Furman, on the
other hand, sent 29 legislatures into frenzied attempts to do just that.
There is another reason why no mandatory penalty can ever exist: such a
statute would still-and necessarily-leave undisturbed vast areas of discretion,
including executive clemency, jury discretion to convict of lesser included
offenses, and "plea bargaining." Even a mandatory statute cannot bar the
capricious prosecutor from exercising his traditional discretion to charge a lesser
offense or a sympathetic governor from commuting all, some, or a random few
death sentences. Even the legislature is powerless to eliminate jury nullification of
a mandatory penalty by returning unwarranted acquittals or, more likely, con-
victions for lesser offenses. The operation of these or other discretionary processes
will continue to produce death sentences as random and capricious as the per-
missive death sentences mentioned in Furman.
C. The Typical Murderer Is Not a Repeater
The main objection to less than capital punishment for the murderer is
his eventual return to society. The main objection is that released offenders will
again endanger the public. However, correctional administrators describe mur-
derers with life sentences as the most adaptable of prisoners and the offense group
presenting the fewest problems in institutional settings. The group also represents
the fewest problems in community release settings. Parole violation recidivism
rates for the murderer are quite startling. It is far less likely that a paroled
68 Id. at 204. Such a procedure is not only beyond human ability; it also inhibits thejury's role. Cf. Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical
Note, 54 B.U.L. REv. 32 (1974); H. KALVN & H. ZEisEL, Tna AMERICAN JURY 435 (1966);
see also Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L. Rav. 1099,
1100 (1953).
69 402 U.S. at 207.
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murderer will murder again or commit any other crime than it is that the burglar,
robber, forger, or thief will commit a new offense while on parole. In point of
fact, murderers are less likely to recidivate than any other category of major
felony offender. In Connecticut, the success rate for parolees convicted of willful
homicide is 97.2 percent; the 2.8 percent failure rate is comprised wholly of
individuals who absconded from parole or committed technical violations."'
Ohio found that of the 169 paroled first degree murderers sentenced to life since
1945, only two have been sent to the penitentiary for new offenses, one for armed
robbery and the other for assault with intent to commit a felony.7 New York
found that only two of the 36 lifers paroled since 1943 have committed any
infractions, one being a technical violation and the other a burglary. Most of the
thirty-six were to have been executed had they not received commutations."1
California, Wisconsin, and Michigan have had similar results.7" All the evidence
reinforces the Royal Commission's report that the release of life sentence prisoners
involves little risk at present. 4
D. Moral Issues
When the State uses capital punishment, "thou shalt not kill" loses the force
of the absolute. Murder and capital punishment are not opposites that cancel
each other, but likenesses that breed their kind. The death penalty is no less
than a legitimzation of extreme violence. It exemplifies and teaches what it seeks
to discourage. The battle over capital punishment is a microcosm of the conflict
between those who see violence as the means of coping with society's problems
and those who oppose violence as counterproductive. Violent force employed
after the fact legitimizes a method of coping with violence that is the antithesis of
the goals society seeks to instill. Capital punishment is the supreme example of
an irrational response which promotes with the right hand what it would like to
discourage with the left.
The "public" nature of executions reflects this ambivalence. A hundred
years ago a large crowd would turn out for a public hanging; today, most people
would condemn executions on television, as have all legislatures who have
weighed the seductively deterrent advantages of televised death.
Today the individual face of death has become blurred by embarrassed
incuriosity and institutionalization. Yet if capital punishment is ever to exercise
its deterrent charms, it deserves to be televised in minute detail; failure to do so
defeats the rationale for its existence. Yet that very reluctance to brutalize
society through a televised report is exactly the reason society should not be
brutalized at all by an actuality too gruesome to be publicized. 5
70 Orland, Without Benefit of Parole, New York Times, July 8, 1972, at 25, col. 6.
71 OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM'N, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 81 (1968).
72 Id. at 62. See Note, Capital Punishment: A Model for Reform, 57 Ky. L.J. 508, 513-
14 (1969).
73 OHIO LEGISLATIr SEav. CoMM'N, supra note 71.
74 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 38 (1949).
75 Indeed, the flip side of this argument is that televised executions will augment the
morbid sensationalism which excites some weak minds to kill merely for the sake of notoriety.
K. MENNINGER, THE Ca jm OF PUNISHMENT 24, 185 (1968) relates examples of how the
publicity surrounding executions has incited many persons to kill in order to die with the
solace of a newspaper headline.
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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
In Justifying Violence," the authors speak about official and unofficial use
of violence (including death) as a means of achieving social control. They con-
clude their analysis as follows:
It seems clear that violence feeds on violence; a violent act tends to
evoke a violent response. The goals of the two types of violence considered
in this research, violence for social control and violence for social change,
stand in marked contrast to each other, yet the means by which these goals
are to be accomplished are identical. It is unlikely that the use of force for
social control will eliminate the desire for social change, although it may
indeed suppress the expression of that desire. It is also unlikely that the use
of violence for social control can be expected to teach the lesson that the
use of violence as a means to an end is unacceptable. Violence for social
control exemplifies the opposite lesson, and by example teaches it.7'
The severity of punishment, Montesquieu wrote, is fitter for despotic governments
whose principle is terror than for a monarchy or republic whose wellspring is
honor and virtue. Legislatures hastily breathing life back into the death penalty
may well be pandering to the very philosophy that penalty is intended to exorcise.
Analysis of public attitudes toward the death penalty reveals that supporters of
the death penalty tend to be the same persons who view violence as a legitimate
means to their own goals. 8
IV. Conclusion
We must be concerned not simply to determine when violence "works"
but to judge its rightness and propriety. The most difficult task for those who
would limit or eliminate violence lies in avoiding situations where some believe
mortal violence legitimate. That task remains the perennial challenge to polit-
ical philosophy, to legislators, and to the law, so long as all power legitimately
rests in the people.
76 M. BLUMENTHAL ET AL., JUSTIFYING VIOLENCE (1972).
77 Id. at 247.
78 Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 1245,
1267 (1974).
The sentiment of most sociologists on the question of capital punishment is probably well
reflected in this frequently cited statement by H. BARNns & N. TETRS, NEw HoRIzoNs IN
CRIMINOLOGY 31 (1951):
Not a single assumption underlying the theory of capital punishment can be squared
with the facts about human nature and social conduct that have been established
through the progress of scientific and sociological thought in the last century and
a half. In fact. the whole concept of capital punishment is scientifically and his-
torically on a par with astrological medicine, the belief in witchcraft, or the rejec-
tion of biological evolution.
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